ADFOCS 2010, Exercises

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Fisher's market model consists of a set B of n buyers and a set G of g divisible goods. Assume the buyers are numbered from 1 to n and the goods from 1 to g. Let f_i be the function specifying the utility derived by buyer i from a bundle of goods. If x_{ij} is the amount of good j received by buyer i, and x_i is the g-dimensional vector whose jth component is x_{ij} , then the utility she derives from this bundle is given by $f_i(x_i)$. Assume buyer i has m_i dollars and w.l.o.g. assume there is 1 unit of each good. The problem is to find equilibrium prices and allocations, i.e., prices s.t. if each buyer is given an optimal bundle of goods, the market clears. Several different utility functions will be considered below.

1. Additively-separable, piecewise-linear, concave utilities: Assume buyers' utility functions are additively-separable, piecewise-linear, concave, and satisfying non-satiation. Give a polynomial time algorithm for testing if given prices p_1, \ldots, p_g are equilibrium prices.

Also, if all parameters are rational and equilibrium exists, show that there must be one that is rational.

2. Leontief utilities: A utility function is Leontief if, given parameters $a_{ij} \ge 0$,

$$f_i(\boldsymbol{x}_i) = \min_j \left\{ \frac{x_{ij}}{a_{ij}} \right\},$$

(assume 0/0 is large enough to not affect the minimization; alternatively, the minimization is only over non-zero a_{ij} 's). Show that the following convex program captures equilibrium for this utility function. Is this a rational convex program?

maximize
$$\sum_{i \in B} m_i \log(u_i)$$
(1)
subject to $\forall i \in B, \ \forall j \in G : \ u_i \leq \frac{x_{ij}}{a_{ij}}$
 $\forall j \in G : \ \sum_{i \in B} x_{ij} \leq 1$
 $\forall i \in B, \ \forall j \in G : \ x_{ij} \geq 0$

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3. Linear utilities: Show that the following convex program captures Fisher's linear case and that it is rational. Interpret b_{ij} as the amount of money spent by buyer i on good j and p_j as the price of good j.

maximize	$\sum_{i \in B, \ j \in G} b_{ij} \log \frac{u_{ij}}{p_j}$	(2)
subject to	$\forall j \in G: \ p_j = \sum_{i \in B} b_{ij}$	
	$\forall i \in B: \ \sum_{i \in G} b_{ij} \le m_i$	
	$\forall i \in B, \ \forall j \in G: \ b_{ij} \ge 0$	